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I. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Appellee Stan Benson, M.D. (hereinafter referred to as "Dr. Benson") requests oral
argument because of the important issues this appeal implicates.
II. LIST OF PARTIES
All parties involved in this appeal are identified in the caption.
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V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-22(4).

VI. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the district court properly determine that Sutter's first filed complaint

was dismissed as of the date that the court was presented with and accepted a signed
stipulation of voluntary dismissal, granted the dismissal, and entered a minute entry
record of the dismissal?
2.

Did the district court properly determine that when the statute of limitations

on Sutter's claim had expired and Sutter relied on the savings statute to refile his claim,
that the tolling provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act extending the
"applicable statute of limitation" did not toll the time allowed by the savings statute for
Sutter to refile his complaint?
Standard of review: Because both issues concern the lower court's summary
judgment order, the standard of review is the same for both issues:
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Norman
v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, TJ15, 57 P.3d 997; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
This Court "give[s] a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment no
deference and review[s] it for correctness." Norman, 2002 UT 81 at ^[15.
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This Court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at %L.
"The proper interpretation of a statute is [] a question of law, which we review for
correctness." Toone v. Weber County, 2002 UT 103, 57 P.3d 1079.
VII. DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
The following rules and statutory provisions are of central importance to the
outcome of this appeal and are attached in their entirety in the Addendum:
A.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(2).
(a)Voluntary Dismissal; effect thereof; (a)(2) By order of
court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action
may only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order
of the court based either on: (a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the
parties who have appeared in the action; or (ii) upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper.

B.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(f)(1).
"An order includes every direction of the court including a minute

order entered in writing, not included in a judgment."
C.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-14-12(3)(a).
The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under
this section tolls the applicable statute of limitation until the
earlier of 60 days following the division's issuance of an
opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the
termination of jurisdiction by the division as provided in this
subsection....

2

D.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-40.
Effect of failure of action not on merits. If any action is
commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or
upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the
time limited either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the
cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal or failure.
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below.

This is a medical malpractice action brought under the provisions of the Health
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-14-1, et. seq. Appellant Michael
Sutter (hereinafter referred to as "Sutter") first filed his complaint on September 23, 1999.
Sutter then filed a stipulation to voluntarily dismiss the complaint without prejudice on
April 19, 2000. The district court granted dismissal on April 20, 2000. Sutter later refilled
the complaint on April 23, 2001. On May 4, 2004, the Court entered an order granting
Dr. Benson's Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissing the complaint as untimely.
Sutter now appeals from the district court's Order of Summary Judgment.
B.

Statement of Facts.

1.

On or about May 26, 1997, Sutter presented to the emergency department at

Dixie Regional Medical Center ("Dixie") for treatment of a large swollen mass in his
right arm. R. 2.
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2.

Attempting to drain the apparent abscess, Dr. Benson made a small incision

on its surface. The incision revealed a ruptured brachial artery. Consequently, later on
May 26, 1997, Sutter underwent surgery to repair the artery. R. 2.
3.

Sutter claims that as a result of Dr. Benson's incision and subsequent

surgery on May 26, 1997, he suffered personal injury, incurred medical expenses, lost
wages and other benefits of employment, suffered pain and anguish of mind and body,
and sustained permanent disfigurement. R. 2.
4.

On May 26, 1999, the last day in which to initiate an action against Dr.

Benson prior to the running of the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions and pursuant to the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("Malpractice Act"), Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-14-8, Sutter mailed a Notice of Intent to Commence Action
to Dr. Benson. R. 44.
5.

Because Sutter's Notice of Intent was served less than ninety days prior to

the expiration of the statute of limitations, Sutter's time for commencing his malpractice
action was extended 120 days from the date of service of the Notice of Intent. As a result,
Sutter's statute of limitations in which to commence his malpractice action was extended
to September 23, 1999. R. 92.
6.

Thereafter, however, Sutter failed to file a request for prelitigation hearing

with DOPL, as required by the Malpractice Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-14-12.
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7.

On September 22, 1999, apparently believing that he had complied with the

prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act, Sutter filed a complaint naming Dr.
Benson. Dixie was served with a summons and the complaint. Dr. Benson was not
served with a summons or complaint. R. 85.
8.

Dixie moved to dismiss the complaint based upon Sutter's failure to comply

with the prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act. Sutter thereafter apparently
realized that he had failed to file a request for prelitigation hearing and that he did not
have the required certificate of compliance from DOPL in order to proceed. R. 92.
9.

On April 19, 2000, Sutter filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal (without

prejudice)" signed by Sutter's attorney and Brinton Burbidge, counsel for Dixie Regional
Medical Center. R 105.
10.

On April 20, 2000, the district court held a hearing on Dixie's Motion to

Dismiss and entered Sutter's stipulated dismissal of the complaint without prejudice,
stating that "[t]here being no one present [at this hearing] and a Stipulation to Dismiss
(Without Prejudice) being filed. Court orders this matter dismissed." R. 108.
11.

On April 24, 2000, the district court's clerk made a computer entry

containing the phrase "Case disposition is dismsd w/o prejudice." R. 108.
12.

On May 9, 2000, Sutter mailed his Second Notice of Intent to Dr. Benson.

R.46.
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13.

On May 11, 2000, Sutter then filed a request for prelitigation panel review.

14.

On September 21, 2000, a prelitigation hearing was held. R. 51.

15.

On November 15, 2000, the prelitigation panel issued its opinion. R. 51.

16.

On November 16, 2000, DOPL issued a certificate of compliance to Sutter.

17.

April 20, 2001, according to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40, was the deadline

R.48.

R. 53.

for Sutter to refile his complaint. R. 79
18.

On April 23, 2001, Sutter refiled his complaint against defendants. R. 3.

19.

A time line summarizing the significant events of the case was presented to

the district court. R. 91 .
20.

On February 11, 2003, Dr. Benson filed his Motion for Summary Judgment

on the basis that Sutter's claims were barred as out of time. The motion was fully briefed
by the parties and the district court held a hearing on the matter on May 22, 2003. R. 114.
21.

At the hearing, the district court granted Dr. Benson's motion and

ultimately entered the Order Granting Stan Benson, M.D.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment (the "Summary Judgment Order") that is at issue in this matter. In the
Summary Judgment Order, the district court made, among others, the following findings:
Plaintiff claims that the date of dismissal of his first
Complaint, Civil No. 990501775, was effective April 24,
2000, the date on which a clerk's computer entry of the fact of
dismissal was apparently made. Dismissal did not occur on

April 24, 2000, but occurred on April 20, 2000, according to
the minute entry which documented the Court's order of
dismissal rendered from the bench at the hearing on the same
date at which no party or attorney appeared. The clerk's
computer entry of the fact of dismissal may have been made
on April 24, 2000, but that did not constitute the dismissal of
Civil No. 990501775, the dismissal having already occurred
on April 20, 2000.
R. 116.
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Sutter first filed his complaint before fulfilling all of the Malpractice Act
prelitigation requirements and subsequently stipulated to the voluntary dismissal of the
complaint. The district court granted the stipulated dismissal of the complaint and
entered its order of dismissal and noted it on a minute entry record. These actions qualify
as an order, under the definition provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1). According to Utah
R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal a court need only order the
case dismissed, nothing more. Thus, the Court's order on April 20, 2000, dismissing the
complaint, was effective on that date. Because Sutter refiled his complaint more than a
year after April 20, 2000, his claims are barred.
Sutter's cited cases are irrelevant, since they all focus on the sufficiency of a final
judgment for purposes of appeal. The instant case differs from these cases in that the
voluntary dismissal was non-appealable, and was memorialized in the parties' submitted
stipulation.
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Finally, the savings statute is not a statute of limitations, and cannot be tolled.
Therefore, the deadline under the savings statute for Sutter to refile his complaint was
April 20, 2001. Having missed that deadline, Sutter is barred from filing his complaint.
X. ARGUMENT
A.

The Court's Ruling and Minute Entry Dismissing Plaintiffs
Lawsuit Based on Stipulation of the Parties Was an Order of
Dismissal and Required No Further Action from the Court or
Parties.

Sutter's complaint was dismissed on April 20, 2000. On that date, the district
court held a hearing to consider Dixie's Motion to Dismiss. The Court was presented
with, and accepted, a stipulated order of dismissal signed by counsel for all the parties
and agreeing to dismissal of Sutter's complaint without prejudice. The district court
granted the motion, and entered its order. As detailed below, these acts were wholly
sufficient to effect the dismissal of Sutter's complaint. There was no longer a case
pending before the district court as of April 20, 2000. Sutter's citation to cases
concerning the sufficiency of final judgments for purposes of appeal are irrelevant and are
not helpful to the issues relevant in this case.
1.

A voluntary dismissal is granted when an order issues, not when a
final appealable judgment is entered.

Rule 41(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the requirements for a
plaintiff to dismiss his or her pending lawsuit: ".. .[A]n action may only be dismissed at
the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on a (i) stipulation of all of
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the parties who have appeared in the action, or (ii)upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Here, Sutter presented to the district
court a signed stipulation for dismissal signed by counsel for all the parties. The Court
ordered the dismissal based on the stipulation and, thus, by operation of Rule 41, the case
was dismissed.
Rule 41 does not require an entry of judgment, nor does it require any written
document. For the purposes of a Rule 41 voluntary dismissal, when a stipulation of all of
the parties is submitted to the court, a case will be dismissed "on order of the court." All
that remains, then, is to define what is meant by "order of the court." Here, the district
court's ruling from the bench in open court, followed by an entry of the ruling in the
court's minutes, constitutes an "order" for purposes of Rule 41.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1) provides the following: "An order includes every direction
of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a judgment."
(emphasis added). Read together with Rule 41(a)(2), an order of the court dismissing the
case occurred when the district court accepted the stipulation, declared at the hearing that
Sutter's complaint was dismissed, and entered that ruling in the docket. As these events
took place on April 20, 2000, Sutter's complaint was dismissed on that day. Because the
dismissal was without prejudice, by operation of the savings statute, Sutter then had until
April 20, 2001, one year later to refile his complaint. Instead, he waited until April 24,
2001. This delay is fatal to his claim and the district court's order should be affirmed.
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2.

Sutter's Case Citations Are Inapposite, as They Deal
with "Judgment" for Purposes of Appeal.

Sutter cites numerous cases analyzing the requirements for entry of judgment and
appeal. He fails to cite cases addressing what is required when a case is voluntarily
dismissed. Cases that seek clarification on the necessary components of a final,
appealable judgment are not helpful to the present case, because a judgment is not the
same as an order based on a stipulation to voluntarily dismiss a case. Rule 54(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, states that "'[jjudgment' as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a). Under this definition,
an order of voluntary dismissal is not a judgment, as no appeal lies from a case that has
been voluntarily dismissed. See Bowers v. Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039
(Utah 1994); see also Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985) ("parties are bound by
their stipulations . . . . " ) .
Given the difference between a judgment and an order of dismissal based on the
stipulation of the parties, Sutter's voluminous case citations are not helpful. Without
exception, each case cited by Sutter in support of his "no final judgment" argument deals
with the sufficiency of a judgment for purposes of appeal. In each of these cases, a Utah
court found that a district court's unsigned minute entry or statement from the bench does
not constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See Ron Shepherd Insurance v.
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994) (finding that court's minute entry did not
constitute a "final judgment for purposes of appeal."); Watson v. Odell, 176 P. 619, 619
10

(Utah 1918) (". .. an order similar to the one [in the instant case] is not a final and
appealable judgment.5'); father v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212, 213 (Utah 1986) ("An appeal
can be taken only from the entry of a final judgment that concludes the action.")
(emphasis added in all).
The focus on a "final judgment for purposes of appeal" has no bearing on the
instant case. Appeals courts insist on a final judgment in order to ground an appeal,
because a final judgment "specifies with certainty a final determination of the rights of
the parties and is susceptible of enforcement." Swenson Assoc. Architects, v. State, 889
P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994) (citing Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740, 741 n.l (Utah 1984)).
This policy associated with requiring a final written judgment is inapplicable here for two
reasons. First, in the instant case, there is a document specifying with certainty a final
determination of the rights of the parties- that is, the stipulation submitted and signed by
the parties, which clearly states that the case should be dismissed without prejudice. If
any appeal from the voluntary dismissal were possible, an appellate court could easily rely
on the signed stipulation as a record of the disposition of the case. See R. 105. Second,
even if no such document existed, it could never be expected that a voluntary dismissal
would be appealed, given that it was agreed to by all the parties. Further, such dismissals
are never appealed because, under the savings statute, plaintiffs are enabled to refile their
claims, if they will do so within the liberal one-year period following dismissal.
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The non-appealability of the stipulated dismissal eliminates the need for a final
entry of judgment. Given that all parties agreed to the dismissal, and they themselves
drafted a document detailing and memorializing the agreement, no final entry of judgment
was needed, and the district court's order sufficed to dismiss the complaint.
Many of Sutter's cited cases are inapposite for another reason. They focus on
situations where a court has ruled on a motion, recorded the ruling in its minutes, and
explicitly stated that a final written order was forthcoming. See Swenson, supra, 889 P.2d
415 (Utah 1994); Watson, supra, 176 P. 619 (Utah 1918); State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264
(Utah 1997); Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2 655 (Utah 1982). When the rulings in these
cases were appealed, each was dismissed because the notice of appeal had been filed
before the final order was entered. It makes sense that when a district court makes a
ruling stating that a future order will be signed, no appeal can lie from the initial ruling.
The present case does not fit into this category of cases, because the district court made
no indication any further order would be issued or required. The district court, in fact,
intended that the complaint be dismissed by stipulation and meant for its minute entry to
be its dismissal order on the case. In its ruling on Dr. Benson's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the district court stated that the case was dismissed on April 20, 2000evidencing its own intention to dismiss that case with its minute entry order. R. 116. In
the absence of some reason to expect some other word from the court on the voluntary
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dismissal stipulation and motion, the district court's minute entry serves as a final order
on the matter.
3.

Even If a Final Judgment for Purposes of Appeal Were
Required Here, the Court's Minute Entry Would
Suffice.

Sutter cites a bevy of cases meant to convince the court that no decision can be
honored if recorded only in a court's minutes. This is assuredly not the case. Several
Utah cases exist in which courts have heard appeals from decisions rendered in minute
entries alone. In Dove v. Cude, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether it could
hear an appeal from a district court's grant of a motion to withdraw a stipulation, which
was recorded as a minute entry. 710 P.2d 170, 171 n. 1 (Utah 1985). The Court
determined that the minute entry constituted a final order, reasoning that "[b]y permitting
withdrawal of the stipulation, the district court determined the rights of the parties in this
case." Id.
In Mcnair v. Hayward, the Supreme Court heard an appeal from a denial of a
criminal defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 666 P.2d 321, 325 n.l (Utah
1984). In reviewing the history of the case, the Court noted multiple motions to dismiss,
which had all been denied by minute entries. The Court held that each of these denials
was a final order for purposes of appeal. Id.
The test for determining when a court's decision can be treated as a final order was
elaborated in Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984). See Dove, 710 P.2d at 171
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n. 1; Swenson, 889 P.2d at 417. The Cannon Court was faced with whether to hear an
appeal from a lower court's memorandum decision ordering a party to disclose the
identity of a witness to a criminal transaction. The Court decided to treat the
memorandum decision as a final order, because "the ruling specifies with certainty a final
determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of enforcement." Cannon,
692P.2dat741 n.l.
This test weighs in favor of treating the district court's dismissal of Sutter's
complaint as a final order. The order made a final determination of each party's rights, as
stated more fully in the stipulation submitted by the parties. No question remained as to
whether the case was still active, whether either party could appeal, or whether some
future order would issue on the matter. Every question and claim remaining in the case
was completely resolved and disposed of in the order. Thus, there is no reason not to treat
the district court's dismissal as a final order.
4.

Sutter Is Not Helped by His Citation to the Rules of
Judicial Administration.

Sutter appears to rely on Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration for
further support of his position that the district court's order of dismissal had no effect.
See Appellant's Brief, at 8. And yet the Rules of Judicial Administration which governed
the case at the time of the dismissal makes specific provisions for approval of stipulated
dismissals. Rule 4-504.01 provides: "(1) in all rulings by the court, counsel for the party
or parties obtaining a ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court
14

may direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with
the ruling." Utah R. Judicial Admin. 4-504.01 (repealed). Sutter suggests that the district
court should have required one of the parties to memorialize its order by submitting a
proposed order to be signed by the district court. This suggestion is negated, however, by
sections (3) and (7) of the same rule:
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be
reduced to writing and presented to the court for
signature within fifteen days of the settlement and
dismissal. . . . (7) No orders, judgments, or decrees
based upon stipulation shall be signed and entered
unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the
attorneys of record for the respective parties and filed
with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the
record.
Utah R. Judicial Admin, 4-504.3,7 (repealed).
Rule 4-504 expressly outlines that stipulations for dismissal are to be handled
differently than other kinds of orders. In the sections concerning stipulations, the sole
requirement is that the stipulation be reduced to writing and submitted to the court soon
after the agreement is reached.
The district court and the parties fulfilled the requirements of Rule 4-504 perfectly.
After reaching an agreement, the parties submitted a signed stipulation to the court, which
the court approved and granted, recording the order in its minutes. To require yet another
writing from the parties, restating exactly what they had already recorded in their
stipulation, would have been nonsensical and redundant- nothing had changed since they
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submitted the stipulation, so nothing could be added to it. The stipulation was an accurate
depiction of the agreement between the parties, and, once approved by the court, properly
reflected the final disposition of the case.
Sutter has not provided this Court any reason to reject the district court's April 20,
2000 order of dismissal. For the reasons set forth supra, the Court should affirm the
district court's finding that Sutter's complaint was dismissed as of April 20, 2000.
B.

The Savings Statute Cannot Be Tolled by the Malpractice Act and
Sutter's Claims Are Time-barred.
1.

When the District Court Entered Dismissal of Sutter's First
Filed Complaint on April 20, 2000, the Statute of Limitations
Had Already Run.

Sutter was allegedly injured on May 26, 1997. Under Utah Code Section 78-144(1), the statute allowed Sutter two years from the date of his injury to file his claim. On
May 26, 1999, the last day Sutter could file his claim, he mailed to Dr. Benson a notice of
intent to commence action. Because Sutter's notice of intent was served fewer than
ninety days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, Sutter's time for
commencing his malpractice action was extended 120 days from the date of service of the
notice of intent. See U.C.A. § 78-14-8. As a result, Sutter's deadline for commencing his
malpractice action was extended to September 23, 1999.
At no time prior to September 23, 1999 did Sutter file a request for hearing which
would have tolled the statute of limitations during the prelitigation process had he made
the request. Sutter, however, apparently believing that he had complied with the
16

prelitigation requirements of the Malpractice Act, Sutter filed a complaint on September
22, 1999. Dixie Regional Medical Center, the only party served with that complaint,
moved to dismiss it for failure to comply with the Malpractice Act's prelitigation
requirements. The district court scheduled a hearing on the motion and the day before the
hearing, Sutter filed a stipulation to dismiss the first filed complaint. Neither Sutter nor
Dixie appeared at the hearing held by the district court and the court recognized and
accepted the parties' stipulated dismissal and entered its order of dismissal by minute
entry on April 20, 2000.
Because the statute of limitations on his malpractice claims had already expired on
September 23, 1999, Sutter's claims, which he voluntarily dismissed on April 20, 2000,
were no longer timely. In order to refile his claims, Sutter turned to the savings statute,
which applies only to those cases where "the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause
of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired . . . . " See U.C.A § 78-12-40. Thus, Sutter's
ability to invoke the savings statute was conditioned on the fact that the applicable statute
of limitations had already expired. Hence, there is no question that the statute of
limitations for the filing of Sutter's malpractice action had expired before his case was
dismissed on April 20, 2000.
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2.

The Savings Statute Is Not a Statute of Limitations and
Cannot Be Tolled.

Given that the statute of limitations had expired, Sutter's only remaining option for
refiling his complaint was the savings statute. Sutter now seeks to apply the tolling
provisions of the Malpractice Act to toll the savings statute to accommodate his tardiness
in refiling his complaint. The savings statute cannot be treated as a statute of limitations
for purposes of tolling under the Malpractice Act for two reasons: First, the savings
statute only becomes applicable when the statute of limitations has already run; and
second, there is no legal precedence, either statutory or judicial for applying the savings
statute as a statute of limitations.
Under the Malpractice Act, the "applicable statute of limitations" governing the
action is tolled during the prelitigation process when the claimant files a request for
hearing. See U.C.A. § 78-14-12(3)(a). In order for Sutter to rely on the savings statute,
the statute of limitations must already have run on his claims. Sutter may not now claim
the right to refile his complaint under the savings statute and treat the savings statute as if
it were a statute of limitation and seek to have the savings statute tolled by the
Malpractice Act.
The "applicable statute of limitations" governing Sutter's claims is found in the
Malpractice Act. See U.C.A. § 78-14-4 (two-year statute of limitations). As set forth
supra, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Sutter's claim expired on
September 23, 1999.
18

Sutter attempts to extricate himself from this dead end by reading the phrase
"applicable statute of limitations" to refer to the savings statute. This reading is not
supported in law. Sutter's disconnection from the law on this point is evidenced by his
habit of referring to the savings statute throughout his brief as the "statute of limitations
provided by Utah Code Section 78-12-40." See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, pp. 5, 28.
Nothing in the statute hints that it could be or should be labeled as a "statute of
limitation." Further, there is not a single Utah case that refers to the savings statute as a
statute of limitation as Sutter does. On the contrary, Utah Courts are consistently careful
to refer to the savings statute and statutes of limitations separately, even when dealing
with both kinds of statutes in the same case. See, e.g., McBride-Williams v. Huard, 2004
UT 21, Tfl4, 94 P.3d 175, 178 (holding that the savings statute and the Malpractice Act's
statute of limitations, 'to the extent that they relate to one another .. .," are motivated by
different policy concerns); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, 70 P.3d 1
(writing that "savings statute suspends enforcement of statute of limitations . . ."); also
Kittredge v. Shaddy, 2001 UT 7, 20 P.3d 285. While it is clear that these two statutes
regularly interact, it is also clear that they are different. Rather than becoming a new,
provisional statute of limitations, when the savings statute is activated, it "suspends
enforcement" of the statute of limitations. Grynberg, 2003 UT at ^[29, 70 P.3d at 29.
Had the Utah State Legislature intended the Malpractice Act's tolling provisions to
apply to the savings statute as well as to "applicable statutes of limitations," it could
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easily have used more expansive language. Broad references to legal time constraints are
included in other statutes. Indeed, the savings statute itself applies to cases which were
filed "in due time," broadly including any action timely brought before the courts in its
first instance, albeit under circumstances in which the relevant statute of limitations has
been modified, extended, or abrogated. See, e.g., Hebertson v. Bank One, 995 P.2d 7
(Utah Ct. App. 1999)(savings statute allowed to run serially as long as first filed and
intermediate complaints are "in due time."). Thus, there is no question that the legislature
is capable of drafting language as expansive as that desired by Mr. Sutter in his reading of
the Malpractice Act. And yet, despite this capability, the drafters of the Malpractice Act
decided to toll only the "the applicable statute of limitations."
"In matters of statutory construction, the best evidence of the true intent and
purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] act is the plain language of the act." Platts v.
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, at 662 (Utah 1997). Given that the Legislature
was capable of crafting the Malpractice Act's tolling provisions to apply to the savings
statute by using expansive language similar to that in the savings statute, but chose not to,
the plain language of the Act must be heeded. The Court, therefore, should apply the
Malpractice Act as expressly written and limit its tolling provision only to the "applicable
statute of limitations."
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There is no case in which the Utah savings statute's one-year refiling period has
ever been tolled or extended in any way.1 Indeed, there is no authority for taking such a
step. The statute plainly reads t h a t " . . . the plaintiff... may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or failure." See U.C.A. § 78-12-40 (emphasis added).
Every Utah case that has taken up the issue of the savings statute has allowed exactly one
year to refile dismissed cases- no more and no less. This fact also lends support to the
idea that the savings statute has never been considered to be a statute of limitationsotherwise, cases might exist in which the savings statute had been tolled. Given the
clarity of the statute and the lockstep approach of the Courts, Sutter's suggestion that the
savings statute can somehow be tolled or expanded is without merit.
C.

Sutter's Failure to Refile His Malpractice Claim Within the OneYear Period Provided Under the Savings Statute Is Fatal to His
Claims.

The above arguments combine to emphasize an important conclusion in this case:
the only way Sutter could have successfully refiled his claim against Dr. Benson was to
file a notice of intent or complaint on or before April 20, 2000. He was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations from filing any suit after September 23, 2000. This
meant that his only remaining option after the dismissal was the savings statute, which
offered exactly one year in which to refile the lawsuit. Given that Sutter's case was

'Of course, the one-year period can be used multiple times in sequence, as stated in
Hebertson, 995 P.2d 7. But this practice simply constitutes the serial invocation of the
statute, rather than an interruption of its mandated time period.
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dismissed on April 20, 2000 by the Court's acceptance of the stipulated dismissal and its
minute entry, Sutter was required to refile his case by April 20, 2001. It is undisputed that
he failed to do so. Thus, Sutter is now completely barred from re-commencing his
lawsuit against Dr. Benson. For these reasons, the district court's ruling of summary
judgment was appropriate and should be affirmed by this Court.
X. CONCLUSION
Sutter has consistently made filings in this matter at the very limits of the time
allotted him. Having skirted the edge numerous times, Sutter made his final filing three
days too late. As a result, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment in
favor of Dr. Benson. In so ruling, the district court determined that its dismissal of
Sutter's first-filed complaint occurred on April 20, 2000 and that Sutter's second-filed
complaint was untimely under both a statute of limitations analysis and savings statute
analysis. Finally, the district court correctly held that Sutter could not extend the savings
statute beyond one year by reliance on the Malpractice Act's tolling provisions that
specifically apply only to the "applicable statute of limitation." For these reasons and
those set forth herein, Dr. Benson respectfully requests the Court affirm summary
judgment in his favor.
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allure of party to attend at own deposition or serve
r to interrogatories or respond to request for inspection.
ty or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party
son designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify
If of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is
,he deposition, after being served with a proper notice,
serve answers or objections to interrogatories submit*r Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories,
serve a written response to a request for inspection
3d under Rule 34, after proper service of the request,
t in which the action is pending on motion may make
lers in regard to the failure as are just, and among
, may take any action authorized under Paragraphs
and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any
in addition thereto, the court shall require the party
o act or the party's attorney or both to pay the
>le expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
mless the court finds that the failure was substantified or that other circumstances make an award of
unjust.
dure to act described in this subdivision may not be
>n the ground that the discovery sought is objectionss the party failing to act has applied for a protective
provided by Rule 26(c).
lure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan.
r or attorney fails to participate in good faith in the
)f a discovery plan by agreement as is required by
f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing,
uch party or attorney to pay to any other party the
e expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the
'ure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness,
or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules
r to amend a prior response to discovery as required
6(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the
ocument or other material at any hearing unless the
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause
ilure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this
the court may order any other sanction, including
of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order
under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the
1
failure to disclose.
PART VI. TRIALS
Jury trial of right.
t preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by
ution or as given by statute shall be preserved to
2nd. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any
e of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee
g upon the other parties a demand therefor in
iny time after the commencement of the action and
lan 10 days after the service of the last pleading
such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a
the party.
• specification of issues. In his demand a party may
Lssues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall
,o have demanded trial by jury for all the issues so
e has demanded trial by jury for only some of the
other party, within 10 days after service of the
iuch lesser time as the court may order, may serve
>r trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of
ction.
i The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to
land as required by this rule and to file it as
Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by
nd for trial by jury made as herein provided may
rawn without the consent of the parties.

Rule 41

Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court.
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as
provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the
register of actions as a jury action. The trial of all issues so
demanded shall be by jury, unless
(a)(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written
stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made
in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the
court sitting without a jury, or
(a)(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds
that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does
not exist, or
(a)(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial.
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by jury as
provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in
which such a demand might have been made of right, the court
in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any
or all issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not
triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the
consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose
verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter
of right.
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance.
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1)
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that due
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and
if the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present
taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; and the testimony
so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and
subject to the same objections that may be made with respect
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and
(B).
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permit;
ted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
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court of the United States or of any state an action based on or order denying or granting the motion shall be filed in each
case.
including the same claim.
(a)(2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of of the first case filed shall be used for all subsequent papers,
this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the and the case shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first:
plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
case. The presiding judge may assign the case to another judge
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have ap- for good cause.
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience
peared in the action; or
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claimj
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of ami
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claimsj
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defen- counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
dant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise Rule 43. Evidence.
specified m the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is
without prejudice.
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall 1
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For" failure of the taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by 1
Dlaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state.,
)rder of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under
>r of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Suprem^
xied by the court without a jury, has completed the presenta- Court.
ion of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on fa<
>ffer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may not appearing of record the court may hear the matter <
nove for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the i
aw the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on i
>f the facts may then determine them and render judgment testimony or depositions.
tgainst the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
intil the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
Rule 44. Proof of official record.
udgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
nake findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in
(a) Authentication of copy. An official record or an enia
ts order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evident
his subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by i
ule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his depu
mproper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates and in the absence of judicial knowledge or competent \
s an adjudication upon the merits.
dence, accompanied with a certificate that such officer ha»|
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party custody. If the office in which the record is kept is within 1
laim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any United States or within a territory or insular posse
ounterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary subject to the dominion of the United States, the cer
ismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of may be made by a judge of a court of record of the distrieg|
ubdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenti
leading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public <
f evidence at the trial or hearing.
having a seal of office and having official duties in the <
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who or political subdivision in which the record is kept, aut]
as once dismissed an action in any court commences an cated by the seal of his office. If the office in which the i
ction based upon or including the same claim against the is kept is in a foreign state or country, the certificate i
ime defendant, the court may make such order for the made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul ge|
ayment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer i
eem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until foreign service of the United States stationed in the fof
le plaintiff has complied with the order.
state or country in which the record is kept, and authenti|
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. by the seal of his office.
hould a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross(b) Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed I
aim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) officer having the custody of an official record or by his de|
>ove, after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified t
Le bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied ]
medy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence J
Iverse party against whom such provisional remedy was the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
itained.
(c) Other proof. This rule does not prevent the pr
official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by j
ule 42. Consolidation; separate trials.
method authorized by any applicable statute or by the i
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common ques- evidence at common law.
(d) Certified copy of record read in evidence. A copy of I
>n of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
nt hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the official record, or entry therein, in the custody of a pu
tions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may officer of this state, or of the United States, certified byJ
ike such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend officer having custody thereof, to be a full, true and i
copy of the original in his custody, may be read in evideno
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
a)(l) A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by the an action or proceeding in the courts of this state, in
Ige assigned to the first case filed. Notice of a motion to manner and with like effect as the original could
isolidate cases shall be given to all parties in each case. The produced.
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ithout motion or notice order the period enlarged if request
erefor is made before the expiration of the period originally
escribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon
otion made after the expiration ofthe specified penod permit
e act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
cusable neglect, but it may not extend the time for taking
y action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and
(b), except to the extent and under the conditions stated m
2m
c) Unaffected by expiration of term The period of time
>vided for the doing of any act or the taking of any
needing is not affected or limited by the continued exisce or expiration of a term of court The continued existence
expiration of a term of court m no way affects the power of
)urt to do any act or take any proceeding m any civil action
t has been pending before it
1) Notice of hearings Notice of a hearing shall be served
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing,
3ss a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of
court Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex
,e application
) Additional time after service by mail Whenever a party
the right or is required to do some act or take some
eedmgs within a prescribed period after the service of a
*e or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is
ed upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of
prescribed period as calculated under subsection (a)
rdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in
•omputation of any 3-day period under this subsection,
)t that if the last day ofthe 3-day penod is a Saturday, a
ay, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of
ext day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday
kRT III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hears, orders, objection to commissioner's order.
Pleadings There shall be a complaint and an answer, a
to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, if the
r contains a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, if a
who was not an original party is summoned under the
tons of Rule 14, and a third-party answer, if a third•omplaint is served No other pleading shall be allowed,
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a
arty answer
Motions An application to the court for an order shall be
ion which, unless made during a hearing or tnal or m
lings before a court commissioner, shall be made m
nee with this rule A motion shall be m writing and
lccmctl} and with particulanty the relief sought and
i ids for the relief sought
emoranda
Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times All mocept uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accom)v a supporting memorandum Within ten days after
)f the motion and supporting memorandum, a party
r
the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition
tve days after service of the memorandum in opposimovmg party may file a reply memorandum, which
united to rebuttal of matters raised in the memoran)pposition No other memoranda will be considered
eave of court A party may attach a proposed order to
memorandum
<ength Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages
ent without leave of the court Reply memoranda
exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the
rt may permit a party to file an over-length memotpon ex parte application and a showing of good

Rule 7

(c)(3) Content
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a statement of matenal facts as to
which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists
Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits
or discovery matenals Each fact set forth in the moving
party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless controverted by the responding
party
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each ofthe
moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a
separate statement of additional facts m dispute For each of
the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any
dispute, supported by citation to relevant matenals, such as
affidavits or discovery matenals For any additional facts set
forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to
supporting matenals, such as affidavits or discovery matenals
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents and a table of authonties with page references
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum
relevant portions of documents cited in the memorandum,
such as affidavits or discovery materials
(d) Request to submit for decision When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for Decision "
The request to submit for decision shall state the date on
which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum,
if any, was served, and whether a heanng has been requested
If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for
decision
(e) Hearings The court may hold a hearing on any motion
A party may request a heanng in the motion in a memorandum or in the request to submit for decision A request for
heanng shall be separately identified in the caption of the
document containing the request The court shall grant a
request for a heanng on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion
that would dispose ofthe action or any claim or defense in the
action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authontatively
decided
(f) Orders
(f)(1) An order includes every direction ofthe court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a
judgment An order for the payment of money may be enforced
m the same manner as if it were a judgment Except as
otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without
notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by the
judge who made it with or without notice Orders shall state
whether they are entered upon tnal, stipulation, motion or the
court's initiative
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed
by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days
after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a
pioposed order in conformity with the court's decision Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after
service The party preparing the order shall file the proposed
order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration
of the time to object
(g) Objection to court coinmissionei 's iecommendatwn A
recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the
court until modified by the court A party may object to the
recommendation by filing an objection in the same manner as
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JUDICIAL CODE

Professional l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e coverage for
p r o v i d e r s — I n s u r a n c e c o m m i s s i o n e r m a y require j o i n t u n d e r w r i t i n g authority.
If the commissioner finds after a hearing that in any part of
this state any professional liability insurance coverage for
health care providers is not readily available in the voluntary
market, and that the public interest requires, he may by
regulation promulgate and implement plans to provide insurance coverage through all insurers issuing professional liability policies and individual and group accident and sickness
policies providing medical, surgical or hospital expense coverage on either a prepaid or an expense incurred basis, including
personal injury protection and medical expense coverage issued incidental to liability insurance policies.
1976
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may only be modified in the event of the death of the judgment
creditor.
(5) If the court finds that the judgment debtor, or the
assignee of his obligation to make periodic payments, has
failed to make periodic payments as ordered by the court, it
shall, in addition to the required periodic payments, order the
judgment debtor or his assignee to pay the judgment creditor
all damages caused by the failure to make payments, including court costs and attorney's fees.
(6) The obligation to make periodic payments for all future
damages, other than damages for loss of future earnings, shall
cease upon the death of the judgment creditor. Damages
awarded for loss of future earnings shall not be reduced or
payments terminated by reason of the death of the judgment
creditor, but shall be paid to persons to whom the judgment
creditor owed a duty of support, as provided by law, immediately prior to his death. In that case the court which rendered
the original judgment may, upon petition of any party in
interest, modify the judgment to award and apportion the
unpaid future damages in accordance with this section.
*J
(7) If security is posted in accordance with Subsection (3^
and approved by a final judgment entered under this sectioxi|
the judgment is considered to be satisfied, and the judgment
debtor on whose behalf the security is posted shall be dial
charged.
i9si

78-14-9.5. P e r i o d i c p a y m e n t of f u t u r e d a m a g e s i n malpractice actions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Future damages" means a judgment creditor's
damages for future medical treatment, care or custody,
loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering.
(b) "Periodic payments" means the payment of money
or delivery of other property to the judgment creditor at
such intervals as ordered by the court.
(2) In any malpractice action against a health care provider,
as defined in Section 78-14-3, the court shall, at the request of 78-14-10. Actions under Utah Governmental Imm
any party, order that future damages which equal or exceed
Act.
$100,000, less amounts payable for attorney's fees and other
The provisions of this act shall apply to malpractice actw
costs which are due at the time of judgment, shall be paid by
against health care providers which are brought under
periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment.
Utah Governmental Immunity Act insofar as they are apj
(3) In rendering a judgment which orders the payment of cable; provided, however, that this act shall in no way affec
future damages by periodic payments, the court shall order the requirements for filing notices of claims, times for
periodic payments to provide a fair correlation between the mencing actions and limitations on amounts recoverable
sustaining of losses and the payment of damages. Lost future der the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
earnings shall be paid over the judgment creditor's work life
78-14-11. Act not retroactive — Exception.
expectancy. The court shall also order, when appropriate, that
The provisions of this act, with the exception of the}
periodic payments increase at a fixed rate, equal to the rate of
inflation which the finder of fact used to determine the amount sions relating to the limitation on the time for comme
of future damages, or as measured by the most recent Conaction, shall not apply to injuries, death or services ]
sumer Price Index applicable to Utah for all goods and which occurred prior to the effective date of this act.
services. The present cash value of all periodic payments shall
equal the fact finder's award of future damages, less any 78-14-12. Division to provide panel — Exempt!
Procedures — Statute of limitations toD
amount paid for attorney's fees and costs. The present cash
Composition of panel — Expenses — Div
value of periodic payments shall be determined by discounting
authorized to set license fees.
the total amount of periodic payments projected over the
(1) (a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in |
judgment creditor's life expectancy, by the rate of interest
medical liability cases against health care pr
which the finder of fact used to reduce the amount of future
defined in Section 78-14-3, except dentists,
damages to present value, or the rate of interest available at
(b) (i) The division shall establish proceduresj
the time of trial on one year U.S. Government Treasury Bills.
litigation consideration of medical liability c
Before periodic payments of future damages may be ordered,
damages arising out of the provision of <
the court shall require a judgment debtor to post security
which assures full payment of those damages. Security for
failure to provide health care.
payment of a judgment of periodic payments may be in one or
(ii) The division may establish rules ne
more of the following forms:
administer the process and procedures rel
(a) a bond executed by a qualified insurer;
prelitigation hearings and the conduct of j
<ij)nan~aTinuityxontract executed by^-qualified4nsurer;—
(c) evidence of applicable and collectable liability insurthrough 78-14-16.
ance with one or more qualified insurers;
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbind
(d) an agreement by one or more qualified insurers to
not subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Ad
guarantee payment of the judgment; or
Procedures Act, but are compulsory as a conj
(e) any other form of security approved by the court.
dent to commencing litigation.
Security which complies with this section may also serve as
(d) Proceedings conducted under authority!
a supersedeas bond, where one is required.
tion are confidential, privileged, and immu
(4) A judgment which orders payment of future damages by
process.
periodic payments shall specify the recipient or recipients of
(2) (a) The party initiating a medical liability
the payments, the dollar amount of the payments, the interval
file a request for prelitigation panel revie:
between payments, and the number of payments or the period
division within 60 days after the service <
of time over which payments shall be made. Those payments
notice of intent to commence action under I
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b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of
ent to commence action. The request shall be mailed to
health care providers named in the notice and request,
i) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review
der this section tolls the applicable statute of limitaris until the earlier of 60 days following the division's
uance of an opinion by the prelitigation panel, or 60
fs following the termination of jurisdiction by the
ision as provided in this subsection. The division shall
id any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by
ular mail.
b) (i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under this section within 180 days after the filing
of the request for prelitigation panel review, or within
any longer period as agreed upon in writing by all
parties to the review.
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division has no further jurisdiction
over the matter subject to review and the claimant is
considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required under tins section prior to the commencement of litigation.
i) (i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by
written stipulation that no useful purpose would be
served by convening a prelitigation panel under this
section.
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division,
the division shall within ten days after receipt enter
an order divesting itself ofjurisdiction over the claim,
as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating
that the claimant has complied with all conditions
precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim.
tie division shall provide for and appoint an approprii\ or panels to hear complaints of medical liability and
s, made by or on behalf of any patient who is an
victim of medical liability. The panels are composed of:
0 one member who is a resident lawyer currently
used and in good standing to practice law in this state
who shall serve as chairman of the panel, who is
ointed by the division from among qualified individuwho have registered with the division indicating a
ingness to serve as panel members, and a willingness
>mply with the rules of professional conduct governing
yrers in the state of Utah, and who has completed
sion training regarding conduct of panel hearings;
) (i) one member who is a licensed health care provider listed under Section 78-14-3, who is practicing
and knowledgeable in the same specialty as the
proposed defendant, and who is appointed by the
division in accordance with Subsection (5); or
(ii) in claims against only hospitals or their employees, one member who is an individual currently
serving in a hospital administration position directly
related to hospital operations or conduct that includes responsibility for the area of practice that is
the subject of the liability claim, and who is appointed
by the division; and
a lay panelist who is not a lawyer, doctor, hospital
loyee, or other health care provider, and who is a
Dnsible citizen of the state, selected and appointed by
livision from among individuals who have completed
ion training with respect to panel hearings.
Each person listed as a health care provider in
on 78-14-3 and practicing under a license issued by
state, is obligated as a condition of holding that
se to participate as a member of a medical liability
ligation panel at reasonable times, places, and inter-
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vals, upon issuance, with advance notice given in a
reasonable time frame, by the division of an Order to
Participate as a Medical Liability Prelitigation Panel
Member.
(b) A licensee may be excused from appearance and
participation as a panel member upon the division finding
participation by the licensee will create an unreasonable
burden or hardship upon the licensee.
(c) A licensee whom the division finds failed to appear
and participate as a panel member when so ordered,
without adequate explanation or justification and without
being excused for cause by the division, may be assessed
an adniinistrative fine not to exceed $5,000.
(d) A licensee whom the division finds intentionally or
repeatedly failed to appear and participate as a panel
member when so ordered, without adequate explanation
or justification and without being excused for cause by the
division, may be assessed an administrative fine not to
exceed $5,000, and is guilty of unprofessional conduct.
(e) All fines collected under Subsections (5Xc) and (d)
shall be deposited in the Physicians Education Fund
created in Section 58-67a-l.
(6) Each person selected as a panel member shall certify,
under oath, that he has no bias or conflict of interest with
respect to any matter under consideration.
(7) Members of the prelitigation hearing panels shall receive per diem compensation and travel expenses for attending panel hearings as established by rules of the division.
(8) (a) In addition to the actual cost of administering the
licensure of health care providers, the division may set
license fees of health care providers within the limits
established by law equal to their proportionate costs of
administering prelitigation panels.
(b) The claimant bears none of the costs of administering the prelitigation panel except under Section 78-14-16.
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78-14-13. Proceedings — Authority of panel — Rights
of parties to proceedings.
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the parties or
witnesses who provided the evidence, documents, and exhibits
at the end of the proceedings upon the request of the parties or
witnesses who provided the evidence.
(2) The division may issue subpoenas for medical records
directly related to the claim of medical liability in accordance
with division rule and in compliance with the following:
(a) the subpoena shall be prepared by the requesting
party in proper form for issuance by the division; and
(b) the subpoena shall be accompanied by.
(i) an affidavit prepared by the person requesting
the subpoena attesting to the fact the medical record
subject to subpoena is believed to be directly related
to the medical liability claim to which the subpoena is
related; or
(ii) by a written release for the medical records to
be provided to the person requesting the subpoena,
signed by the individual who is the subject of the
medical record or by that individual's guardian or
conservator.
(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and expenses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigation
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related
to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including
witness fees and mileage.
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation
of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of
the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
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78-12-39
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78-12-39. Effect of war.
When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a country at
war with the United States, the time of the continuance of the
war is not a part of the period limited for the commencement
of the action.
1963
78-12-40. Effect of failure of action n o t o n merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the
merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for
commencmg the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may
commence a new action within one year after the reversal or
failure.
1953
78-12-41. Effect of injunction o r prohibition.
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of
the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action.
1953
78-12-42. Disability m u s t exist w h e n right of action
accrues.
No person can avail himself of a disability, unless it existed
when his right of action accrued.
1953
78-12-43. All disabilities m u s t b e removed.
When two or more disabilities coexist at the tune the right
of action accrues, the limitation does not attach until all are
removed.
1953
78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or
promise t o pay.
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to
pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought
within the period prescribed for the same after such payment,
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or
promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged
thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of
any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action
or ground of defense.
1953
78-12-45. Action barred i n a n o t h e r state barred here.
When a cause of action has arisen in another state or
territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an
action thereon cannot there be maintained against a person by
reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be
maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one
who has been a citizen of this state and who has held the cause
of action from the time it accrued.
1953
78-12-46. "Action" i n c l u d e s special proceeding.
The word "action," as used in this chapter, is to be construed,
whenever it is necessary to do so, as including a special
proceeding of a civil nature.
1953
78-12-47. S e p a r a t e trial of statute of limitations i s s u e
in malpractice actions.
In any action against a physician and surgeon, dentist,
osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical therapist, registered nurse, clinical laboratory bioanalyst, clinical laboratory
technologist, or a licensed hospital, person,firmor corporation
as the employer of any such person for professional negligence
or for rendering professional services without consent, if the
responsive pleading of the defendant pleads that the action is
barred by the statute of limitations, and if either party so
moves the court, the issue raised thereby may be tried
separately and before any other issues in the case are tried. If
the issue raised by the defense of the statute of limitations is

finally determined in favor of the plaintiff, the
issues shall then be tried.
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive.
78-12-48. Statute of limitations — Asbestos < ___
(1) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of
statute of limitation or repose may b a r an _
recover damages from any manufacturer of any coj-L
tion materials containing asbestos and arising outS
manufacturer's providing of the materials, directf
through other persons, for use in construction 1 ^
building within the state until July 1, 1991, or untL
years after the person or entity bringing theV|t
discovers or with reasonable diligence could haveH
ered the injury or damages, whichever i s later.'7
(b) Subsection (a) provides a statute of limits,
the specified actions, and also acts retroactively to t
within time limits, the commencement of actions^
this section that are otherwise barred.
(2) A s used in this section, "asbestos" means asb
varieties of:
(a) chrysotile (serpentine);
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite);
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite);
(d) anthophyllite;
(e) tremolite; or
(f) actinolite.
CHAPTER 12a
PROCESS SERVER ACT
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78-12a-l. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Process Server Acfc£
78-12a-2. Process servers.
(1) Persons who are not peace officers, constabl
or lawfully appointed deputies of such officers*, or ^
state investigators may not serve any forms of civil oa
process other than complaints, summonses, and si
(2) The following persons may serve all p]
the courts of this state except as otherwise limii
tion (1):
(a) a peace officer employed by any political
of the state actmg within the scope and j
employment;
(b) a sheriff or appointed deputy sheriff
any county of the state;
(c) a constable serving in compliance wij
law;
~~~
(d) an investigator employed by t h e si
rized by law to serve civil process.
(3) Private investigators licensed in acco]
53, Chapter 9, Private Investigator Regulation
serve the following forms of process:
(a) petitions;
(b) complaints;
(c) summonses;
(d) supplemental orders;
(e) orders to show cause;
(f) notices;
(g) small claims affidavits;
(h) small claims orders;
(i) writs of garnishment;

